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Abstract: 
Out of the devastation of the Second World War, London was subject of 
significant investment in re-planning and urban development. Post-War Britain 
situated urban planning at the centre of an ethically-charged political discourse 
on national reconstruction and the building of an equitable post-War society. 
The "post-War settlement" was an attempt at creating a just society, where 
central major policy fields were new state funded housing and the re-design of 
major cities. The first and second sections of this paper construct an historical 
narrative of post-War political development, and the second and third sections 
argue that a central achievement and central failure of the "post-War 
settlement" was the emergence of international modernism and architecture-
led public planning. 
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Introduction 
 
Modern London's historical evolution was heavily punctuated by the Second World 
War, which remains a principle reference point for understanding the evolution of 
policy frameworks on the future evolution of the city. The common historical 
periodisation of "post-War" extends into the early 1960s, as the planned 
reconstruction was painfully slow due to the lack of finance and raw materials. 
National "re-building", while principally involved civil engineering and the 
reconstruction of city centres, was also profoundly political and intellectual. 
Successive governments since Clement Atlee's first post-War Labour government 
(1945-1951), employed urban planning as politically symbolic of social transformation 
and, literally, of re-building British society itself. While no Government statute or Act of 
Parliament (law) ever designated London as the official capital of the the country, it 
evidently remained in an indisputable category of leadership in all public policy fields, 
but on which scholarly research remains slight. (1)  
 
Research on London has tended to concentrate, for obvious reasons, on political 
authority and monarchy, London's diverse social life, and its architecture. While 
London's post-War urban development is extensive and complex, this paper will 
identify only the significant policy innovations that positioned "planning" as central to 
the political project of building an equitable society. These the significant policy 
innovations will generate research questions that will be instrumental in a fuller 
comparative analysis of London and its European counterparts, including the cultural 
implications of urban development. They will also serve as the basis of further 
research on the evolution of London's globalisation and popular recognition as a 
principal "global city". The first two sections will construct an historical narrative, from 
which the second two sections can account for the success yet national rejection of 
an architecture-led public planning of a new model society.  
 
 
Section One: Planning and governance post-War   
 
London's governance has never been strong, and never entirely separate from 
national government and parliamentary interests based in the City of Westminster. 
Provisions for a central mayoralty for the whole city were only made with the Greater 
London Authority Act 1999. While the City of London (host to only 9,000 residents) 
has maintained a stable political system since Anglo-Saxon times, the amorphous 
urban expanse of Greater London has only recently been subject to a single strategic 
authority. This fact is one of many that support the political myth that London is 
"unplannable", the seminal reference point being the aftermath of the Great Fire of 
London in 1666. In 1667, Sir Christopher Wren’s new Plan for London (the first of its 
kind, and highly inspired by Paris) failed, largely as a mass of private landowners 
rebuilt the city faster than public authorities could enforce a plan. (2) Since then, the 
varied jurisdictions of London's territorial expanse have asserted themselves with 
their own local particularities, and London has become characterised by, in the words 
of Reyner Banham, the ambitions of private citizens. (3) And while all of London is 
now securely bounded and subject to the strategic office of the current Mayor of 
London, this office is "only" strategic: the Mayoralty's political power is limited in such 
a way as to demand the partnership and agreement of the city's many powerful 
interests and interest groups, the principle of which as the 32 "boroughs" or districts 
of London, who all retain significant political jurisdiction over planning and urban 
development. (4)  
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While London was partially divested by World War Two, it is historically erroneous to 
consider planning and urban development since 1945 principally as a response to the 
devastation wrought by German aerial bombardment. The immediate post-War 
planning effort was indeed revolutionary, but also animated by planning ideas and 
movements that had emerged from the nineteenth century. The rejection of War victor 
Winston Churchill as post-War Prime Minister, and the public's choice of the Labour 
Party’s Clement Atlee, was a surprise but only in retrospect. As part of a War-time 
coalition, both had offered the public appealing visions of a post-War Britain, both had 
appealed to already established national discourses on housing and planning, whose 
most immediate source was Liberal Prime Minister Lloyd George post-World War One 
"Homes for Heroes" campaign (1919). Subsequent innovations in state (in English, 
"council" or local authority) housing became the political fulcrum for all planning and 
broader aspirations to modernise and re-design Britain's cities. The Housing of the 
Working Classes Act of 1890 had initially provided the seminal legal basis of state 
intervention in the sacred relation between the land and private individual, but 
conceived of housing as "public health" not a building or urban development policy. 
(5) Nonetheless, what following was a range of public (political) inquiries into the living 
conditions of the labouring classes, and the interrelation of "urban" and "social" was 
forever wedded in the discourse on planning. Peabody, Guinness, Cadbury and other 
industrial pioneers had already taken up an interest in new mass housing design and 
the potential for social transformation. But where the Lloyd George campaign largely 
failed, the reduction of large parts of British cities to rubble under German aerial 
bombing (from September 1940) urban planning was infused with an indisputable 
moral imperative. (6)  
 
London's first governing entity was the Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW) from 
1855, an appointed committee, which pioneered among other things the London 
sewerage system and other infrastructural projects. The London County Council 
(LCC) of 1889 was London's first elected body. As part of the Local Government Act 
1888, it evolved urban planning competencies, pioneered council housing and 
egalitarian education policies, and after the War its Department of Architecture and 
Civic Design (and Town Planning Committee) generated seminal ideas for new urban 
development. With some political power over the new 28 metropolitan boroughs, with 
the LCC, London was still only a "county" (with no greater powers than any other 
county of England). It was the London Government Act 1963 that provided for a 
Greater London Council (the GLC), 32 new London boroughs and significant political 
jurisdiction. The GLC resided in the now famous County Hall obliquely opposite the 
Houses of Parliament; designed by architect Ralph Knott and opened in 1933, like the 
LCC it became a pioneer in urban planning as well radical Leftist social aspirations, to 
be closed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher using a new Local Government Act in 
1985. The GLC's radicalism was born in the conflict between the social demands of a 
growing and diverse populace, and the increasing value of land as the site and 
resource of urban industrialisation. They grappled with the essential dilemma of the 
1980s -- London was losing its heavy industry in the face of a social expansion (and 
need for housing).  
 
Of the many political-legal frameworks (Acts of parliament) on planning passed by 
Government, The Town and Country Planning Act 1947 was the pivotal post-War 
moment as it established the principles of modern urban planning in London: property 
ownership was to be subject to state planning, and local development to broader 
regional strategies (localised planning and the 1400 national planning offices around 
the country were abolished in favour of strategic approaches of competent local 
government); compulsory purchase of private land could be made by public 
authorities for development; public authorities could trade, lease or loan land; and 
lastly, the outer London boroughs could begin to enforce a "green belt" or city limit, a 
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notion that had been around since the 1930s but consolidated in the Act and ensured 
London's boundary and consequently internal urban density since that time. (7)   
 
The significance of these principles is that planning was defined in terms of 
autonomous professional local authority competency in design as much as the social 
principles that animated the effective design of cities -- where social welfare and 
economic production were assumed to be interrelated.  
 
This was registered in how, by 1947, city planning was a major issue of public 
interest. As early as 1940 saw Thomas Sharp's humble Penguin publication, Town 
Planning, sell a quarter of a million copies during the remaining years of the war. From 
the early 1940s, numerous popular publications can be found such as the Picture Post 
issue of January 1941, "A Plan for Britain", and the Signpost magazine special issue, 
"Why Planning?" (1944). (8) The latter was in part inspired by the new County of 
London Plan of 1943, commissioned by the London County Council and written by 
University of London professor Patrick Abercrombie (1879–1957) and John Henry 
Forshaw (1895–1973) chief architect of the LCC. The County of London Plan sold 
10,000 copies in 1943, and abridged versions were distributed to public employees, 
schoolchildren and armed forces. It was also subject to scrutiny by other architects 
(Cf. Carter and Goldfinger's The County of London Plan of 1945). It was quickly 
followed in 1944 by Patrick Abercrombie's new concept of The Greater London Plan. 
Neither of which were implemented, they informed the public and intellectual interest 
in the re-design and re-conception of the city. The County of London Plan was 
promoted by an exhibition at Westminster Hall in July 1943, receiving over 10,000 
visitors including George VI and Queen Elizabeth; a further 50,000 saw the following 
exhibition at the Royal Society of Arts (near the Strand). (9) The Greater London Plan 
itself was promoted by a nationally broadcast film "The Proud City - A plan for 
London", produced for the Government's then Ministry of Information. (10)  
 
Both plans had advanced the priority of high density public housing whose scale was 
proportionate to open spaces and to transportation (to open space); it advocated the 
re-design of the whole of London (not just the bombed and cleared areas); it 
advocated an urban design around existing social communities, responsive to both 
the pattern of community life and also historical culture. Most of all, both plans 
advocated a planning governance and what Abercrombie, in both reports, referred to 
as "control" over size, the location of industry, and its subsequent expansion.  
 
The history of London's urban development since 1947 is the history of an effort to 
control, forge governing mechanisms of control, and failing to control the unintended 
consequences of planning itself. The early Post-War period nonetheless defined a 
conception of urban planning through which a critical comprehension of London's 
post-War evolution can be constructed. (11)  
 
 
Section Two: The emergence of the public architect 
 
While there have been many research projects that have attempted to "map" the 
extent of London's World War Two bomb damage (and hence the physical basis and 
partial rationale for the form of urban development that followed). (12) Indeed, at the 
time, the Ministry of Home Security conducted two bomb census maps between 
October 1940 and June 1941, there have been no precise surveys of the final 
destruction. That may be as the final destruction would include all the buildings 
deemed unsafe and thus where public authorities opportunistically engaged in 
wholesale "slum clearance". The Slum Clearance Act had passed in 1930, and the 
vision of London's Victorian social squalor had become notorious since Gustav 
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Doré's commercially successful book, London: A Pilgrimage, made it was across 
Europe in the 1870s. The East of London and City of London district saw the most 
intense concentration of bombing, and being near to the docklands were the site of 
the largest slum areas. Lack of precision technology resulted in very random bomb 
damage -- and more so where the Luftwaffe experimented with a range of incendiary 
and explosive gas. It was the prospect of the eradication of the London of the slums 
that probably motivated, at least in part, LCC leader Lord Latham in stating (in his 
Foreword to The County of London Plan): “The war has given us a great opportunity, 
and by the bitter destruction of so many acres of buildings it has made easier the 
realisation of some of our dreams.” (13) 
   
Slum clearance became an almost incontestable political economy internal to 
London's development -- where even up to the 1960s, local authorities were 
designating entire areas under public planning control and so de facto beyond 
legitimate objection. The 1949 Housing Act further supported local authority 
obligation to properly house all local people, and not just previously designated 
"workers". The now famous 1942 Beverage Report, which became the basis of a 
range of crucial nationalisation policies, aimed at a universal social service order, not 
a welfare state for the lower classes. What Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevin, called " 
the biggest single experiment in social service that the world has ever seen 
undertaken", also animated planning (14). Importantly it provoked each party Left 
and Right a response: Winston Churchill's now famous 1943 "After the War" 
speeches we find examples of competing national welfare projections, where state 
housing provision became a central promise. (15) 
 
Even after the re-election of Conservative Churchill in 1951, the "post-War 
settlement", as it has been known to historians, remained. The Conservative 
dominated 1950s may have halted the putative march to a socialist republic, but 
entrenched the assumption on public ownership of land, vital economic infrastructure 
and social services. As executive manager of the new social service state, 
government gained an incontestable moral authority over urban planning, not least 
as the private patronage of building virtually disappeared. The Beverage priorities 
were social (the "giant evils" of squalor, ignorance, want, idleness, and disease), 
each of which were met with planned responses. Planning became a virtual ideology, 
where the architectural rhetoric of public works were understood to articulate the 
concerted war of the state against Beveridge's giant evils. (16)      
 
Throughout the post-War period, therefore, the political dilemma emerged, that the 
new post-War social service state was established at the cost of an authoritarian 
assertion of the public interest over private, equating state with "public", and 
assuming the state catered for the interest of citizens who were also private. The 
1950s and the poor performance of the newly nationalised industries of transport and 
energy, witnessed an interminable tension between the necessity of public ownership 
and the efficiency of public management. And the role of the market -- in London, 
and with the decline of Empire, a growing international market -- what role the does 
the "private" citizen play in the formation of the emerging metropolitan city?  
 
The new housing estates were so named "estates" after the grounds of landed 
aristocracy, symbolic of a egalitarian democratic state that had replaced a heavily 
stratified Empire. Each new housing estate was greeted by public fanfare, media 
news, members of Parliament and occasionally the Royal family. Even by 1940, 
there remained 250,000 registered homeless in London's central boroughs, and the 
hundreds of thousands of destroyed houses were still lying in rubble. New housing 
estates were proclamations of the new model society, with particular examples being 
The Sandringham Road Housing Scheme, Hackney (1948), and the Lansbury Estate 
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in Tower Hamlets (1949-51). Such estates, while notionally for the homeless or 
dispossessed by the bombing, admitted people only on application with conditions 
both moral and economic (only those of good repute in regular employment); they 
were managed by a janitor (often ex-military), who had powers to enforce social 
behavioural norms that today would seem puritanical.  
 
A central dimension of the post-War settlement was cultural -- the architectural 
values and innovations of international modernism became a central mechanism for 
the construction of a new urban realm. The Festival of Britain, 1951, was a critical 
moment. Held on the anniversary of the Great Exhibition of 1851 (the pioneering 
World Fair) the festival did not feature Empire or industrial might but new design, 
architecture and planning, the new rhetoric of the model society. (17) Its location on 
the ugly industrial wasteland of Lambeth Marsh on the south of the Thames river 
(with satellite events around the country), the festival exemplified the processes of 
social transformation the nation was promised. Driven by London County Council 
architects and planners, over eight million visitors people enjoyed the iconic "Skylon" 
sculptural tower, the huge and innovative exhibition dome, the Town Planning 
Pavilion, various house building exhibits, the Telekinema cinema and the new Royal 
Festival Hall (the only structure still remaining). (18)  
 
Of significance in the festival is its promotion of a coherent set of aesthetic values, 
and whose modernist design-based rhetoric was later referred to in the press and 
media as the "festival style" or the "contemporary style". The Royal Festival Hall goes 
some way to exemplify this, even if the current building differs from the festival's (less 
austere) design.  
 
The rhetorical assertiveness of the Festival Hall is unmistakable -- with no symbolic 
content or expression of history and tradition, and at once accessible from all sides, 
its open-planned interior reveals a rationale and self-explanatory organisation of 
space; the building is functional and an evident response to its relation between the 
site (location) and anticipated social activity both within and without its walls. Its 
values are openness and transparency, a non-hierarchical and multi-directional 
facility, able to adapt its internal partition walls to changing social requirements. The 
building is designed along an horizontal not vertical axis, is bounded on all sides by 
planes of untextured surfaces, like a non-descript industrial facility; its value is 
invested in its social function. It articulates both a new democratic order, but does so 
with an uncompromising solution to social organisation.  
 
The contemporary rhetoric of the new post-War model society was displayed in 
another London County Council project, the Alton Housing Estate in Roehampton 
(1952-8). On the Western edge of the city, bordering Richmond Park, it accentuated 
both built form and the natural environment through their physical contrast. Each 
exemplified the emerging modernist demand for an integration of social, aesthetic 
and economic dynamics within an entirely egalitarian, functional and rationally 
ordered space. Scandinavian modernism was the principle influence for the Alton 
East part of the estate (1952), with Le Corbusier's Unité d'habitation in Marseilles 
(completed around 1952) the essential point of reference for the Alton West six years 
later, with its five 11-storey "slab" blocks. Alton cultivates social community and 
affirmative response and remains popular with its 13,000 inhabitants.  
 
Le Corbusier-influenced independent architect and Hungarian émigré, Ernő 
Goldfinger (1902-1987), is an indicative figure in the growing international intellectual 
culture emerging around public planning. A commentator on the County of London 
Plan in the early 1940s, Goldfinger offered the new Greater London Council, an 
advance on modernist approaches to housing. (19) While Alton Estate and its 
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Richmond Park setting was ideally suited to Le Corbusier's modern ideal of a Ville 
Radieuse (1924) or city park unity of built form and nature, a more urgent problem 
was lack of space, and lack of nature. Inner London's East End, where slum 
clearance was continuing into the 1970s, was a social challenge and a test as to 
whether the LCC architect-led model of urban planning was credible. Commissioned 
by the LCC in 1963 for the Tower Hamlet's borough, he designed this and two other 
houses for the Brownfield Estate. Balfron is 26-storey block accommodating 146 
dwellings, and while imposing, the scale of the apartments maximise room for social 
life as well as day to day living, and the natural light and the advantage of views 
admit "nature" to the concrete construct. His concept was perfected five years later in 
his commission for Trellick Tower (1970-72) in West London.  
 
Goldfinger had temporarily resided in the Balfron tower himself as a means of 
researching the resident experience. The term "Brutalism" was already being used in 
the media as a way of referring to the modernist public buildings that followed the 
Royal Festival Hall (Denys Lasdun's Royal National Theatre being exemplary). As a 
term used by visionary modernists, Peter and Alison Smithson with reference to Le 
Corbusier's béton brut, Brutalism was made somewhat famous by critic Reyner 
Banham's 1966 book, The New Brutalism: Ethic or Aesthetic? (20) Brutalism was not 
an official movement, but designated a British approach to international modernism 
and its use of concrete, steel and glass. White thinly-clad planes, hard surfaces and 
open vistas (of Le Corbusier's Unité d'habitation in Marseilles) functioned well in a 
Mediterranean climate, whereas Britain required a more robust insulation. Moreover, 
Balfron was provocative, icon and a statement demanding a shift in understanding. It 
also met the acute demand for fast yet well-built and relatively low-cost mass 
housing, and in a stylistic vernacular that articulated a hope for a better future.  
 
 
Section Three International modernism and a new public realm 
 
A new generation of "high risers" emerged, and for boroughs were often a strategic 
replacement of tenements (Victorian apartment blocks) and slum areas now cleared; 
and this high-density housing option dominated state housing provision for two 
decades or more. While the "vertical street" -- a term used by London modernist 
pioneer Denys Lasdun with his 1957 16-storey Keeling House in Bethnal Green, East 
London -- was a central modernist innovation, the exclusive association of the high 
rise with modernism per se is not accurate. Camden Borough Council and north 
London architects were at the time pioneering horizontal low-rise estates, such as 
the Dunboyne Estate in Gospel Oak (1967), and Alexandra and Ainsworth Estate in 
St John's Wood (1968), both led by Neave Brown and the Camden Architects 
Department, and presented equally effective ways of creating a new public realm of 
housing and social life. (21)  
 
Like Lasdun, Goldfinger understood the social requirements of modernism and 
innovated a range of internal features similar to Lasdun's Keeling House, including 
communal areas, internal partitions and sliding doors, as well as fitted amenities like 
kitchens. Goldfinger's innovation was a visually striking adjacent service tower 
(insulating apartments from noise as well as providing collective washing machines, 
a refuse chute and a room for plants). The tower did not isolate residents from vital 
amenities: it was serviced by shops, an office, and a youth center. Structurally, the 
building remains 31 floors high, with internal stairwells and external corridors every 
third floor. Of its 217 apartments, two higher floors feature split level maisonettes. 
Privacy and access are balanced, and the balconies, large fenestration, maximum 
natural light and views of London offer aesthetic rewards few occupants of wealthier 
houses could enjoy.  
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While most mass housing was associated with the labouring class, The City of 
London's prestige cultural complex, the Barbican Centre, began as a housing estate 
for the professional worker. The history of the entire complex is extensive, but the 
initial high density residential designs were a coherent and considerable advance on 
British Brutalism and its concentration on single or co-extensive units. The Barbican 
was a hybrid and luxurious estate, where refined design values extended to the 
shape of internal doorways and tap fittings. With the initial construction phase 
opening in 1969 (and construction continuing until 1976), it was not until 1982 that an 
innovative multidisciplinary arts center was founded. The attraction to the initial 
generation of professional tenants, was not the amenities or late prestige. (22)  
 
Commissioned by the City of London (its Court of Common Council), and situated 
within a 1947, Greater London Plan-inspired Barbican Area Reconstruction Plan, the 
main architects were three young university lecturers Peter Chamberlin, Geoffrey 
Powell and Christof Bon. The credibility of the three emerged from designing nearby 
Golden Lane Estate, which opened in 1957. Over 500 dwellings, the Golden estate 
was a series of housing blocks, planar geometry, undecorated materials of brick, 
concrete and surface painted primary colours, balconies, open stairwells and 
contiguous internal spaces as well as external communal areas emphasised its Le 
Corbusian influences. Hand-chiseled concrete provided rusticated texture to two 
horizontal blocks of four apartments, obliquely linked by rows of maisonettes and a 
long artificial lake; an adjoining horseshoe block crowned the site, which was 
overlooked by three seemingly randomly placed 44-floor towers (the highest in 
Europe at the time). All of these areas were interconnected by ramps and elevated 
walkways.  
 
The achievements of the Barbican Estate is primarily its exemplification of a non-
dogmatic methodology of international modernism. The Barbican was irregular and 
echoed the eccentric characteristics of old London -- what Reyner Banham referred 
to as the "sudden glimpse", the "unusual angle", the "surprise", and how the 
clustering and density of London's buildings can be suddenly relieved by an open 
vista, a garden or public walkway (23). The Barbican is not strict geometry, but where 
geometric rationality is use to define the shapes, materials and inflections that 
aesthetically express London's historic streets and its panoply of historical narratives 
(not least London's pretentions to Rome or Babylon). The gradual growth of plants 
and window boxes on the horizontal blocks exemplify the estates adaptability -- over 
three decades and increasing demands it has extended a network of underground 
services and transportation routes, incorporating a college, expansive cultural 
facilities as well as civic facilities (public library, trade exhibition halls), and facilitates 
multi-directional accessibility, movement and minimal noise disturbance for large 
numbers of residents and visitors alike. Its spatial organisation allows for further 
architectural development, as the architects envisaged the water features and 
walkways to be ultimately extended from the estate around the City of London.   
 
The modernist challenge to British post-War planning, which culminated in the 
1970s, was essential political: firstly, its conception of housing was as a composite 
social category where architectural design shaped sociological knowledge on lifestyle 
in relation to resources; secondly, the social conditions of housing were grounded in 
specific place-based aspirations to assert human values within pressing economic 
demands (i.e. labour and its expression in both leisure and culture). Housing was 
paradigmatic for place-based design, as it necessitated an architectural mediation of 
essential needs along with cooperative co-existence. Housing was also a laboratory 
for design innovation, building technique, new materials and technologies, and 
moreover the building and rebuilding of housing could be central to local economy, 
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and was never envisaged as a static entity. The integration of new settlement 
patterns with industrial growth, new cultural centers, and new sources of communal 
or collective belonging, was internal to the intellectual commitments of international 
modernism, in the UK represented by CIAM (Congrès internationaux d'architecture 
moderne) adherents The Modern Architects’ Research Society (MARS). (24)  
 
Between 1933-42, MARS had published a modernist version of the London Plan 
(designed largely by Arthur Korn and Felix Samuely), and despite their revolutionary 
intentions was never quite able to play the professionally assertive role of the Union 
des Artistes Modernes in France. (25) Nonetheless, the influence of international 
modernism in post-War British architecture formed a set of values that could be 
articulated under conditions of scarcity and economic austerity. Modernist 
construction, using concrete, steel and glass, were swift and open to technical 
innovation as well as modulation by other materials (Goldfinger used  to soften the 
hard surfaces of Trellick Tower apartments). Committed to CIAMs seminal Charte 
d'Athènes of 1933 (by Le Corbusier, whose full expression was his 1935 Ville 
Radieuse publication), architects are defined principally as organisers of social 
space. For CIAM, all social activity is most effectively organised by an aesthetics of 
design, where design is continually be informed by the latest technology and 
evolution in materials. Le Corbusier's Ville Radieuse was an explicit means of social 
reform, but unlike earlier industrial aesthetes -- the influence of William Morris and 
the "truth to materials" tradition in British architecture, craft and sculpture since the 
1860s -- CIAM's " functional city" approach was an aesthetics of a fast-changing 
labour and production. The "functional" dimension was the way architecture provided 
space and framework for dynamic, productive, working life -- rapid social change and 
environmental adaptation.  
 
The modernist approach was much caricatured by the media and by politicians, 
whose cliché’s are well known. What was more disturbing was the wholesale 
association of modernism with the putative failure of post-War settlement and the 
urban planning so heavily invested in innovative high-density housing and a social 
vision of collective change. And while it is true, that the public authority architect-
dominated approach to urban planning did fail to manage the day-to-day difficulties in 
housing, such as maintenance and social order (only in the late 1970s did London 
boroughs form "housing management" offices) the demise of modernism in London 
and nationally was more paradoxical. For all its modularity and use of a universal 
lexicon of geometry, international modernism was a bespoke designer's response to 
a specific place-based phenomenology of social modernity (life under conditions of 
industrialisation). It suffered the fate of industrialisation itself -- for from the 1960s, 
the demand of local authorities for mass housing grew so strong, factory-made 
building design units began to supply a massively expanding house building and 
town construction industry. These "systems" buildings, looked, in terms of their 
design vocabulary and their materials, authentic modernist designs, but were 
"building design" as distinct from architecture. There was no research, innovation, 
specific place-based design, but only prefabricated solutions to mass 
accommodation on increasingly small and poorly serviced land plots. The impact was 
physically, as much as culturally, disastrous. (26) 
 
Ronan Point, Newham in East London, was a pivotal moment. The partial collapse of 
this 21-storey systems-built tower in May 1968 (two months after opening), killed four 
people and injured seventeen. The media reporting fomented a generalised national 
ridicule of the high-riser and genuine icons of modernist achievement. While 
provoking major changes in UK building regulations (an Amendment in 1970), and 
the public inquiry into the inadequate systems-build, systems-building continued -- 
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obviating the need for a public reinvestment in architecture and local planning 
authorities.  
 
The short-term benefits of systems-building was evident to local commissioning 
authorities: it was fast, cheap and made-to-order, it obviated the need for architects, 
surveyors, civil engineers and even skilled builders. Building involved only panels on 
a crane to be lifted and bolted into place around a central core block of concrete. The 
Bison Wall Frame System was a prime example, and there were as many as building 
contractors willing to enroll a small army of cheap unskilled labourers to build them. 
In 1964, the Conservative Government's official house-building target was 350,000 
new houses a year; the Labour Government was competing on a political 
commitment to 500,000 a year. From 1956, Government awarded local authorities 
with special subsidies for high-rise dwellings (which increased the higher the 
building). Targets meant that traditional competitive tendering was discarded in 
favour of building contractor promises: by 1970s the Government was aiming for 
40% of all house building to be industrialised in this way, in part because of the 
regular employment for unskilled labour the industry could offer.  
 
The Government Ministry of Housing and Local Government, responsible throughout 
the decades of the 1960s and 70s never released essential files on the inspection or 
evaluation of these housing units; the independent National Building Agency was 
similarly neglectful. The triangular relationship between the public architects, the 
contractors and the politicians, became a close one of a tacit acceptance of 
corruption, low standards and public finances -- with the integrity of modernist 
architecture being the ultimate victim.   
 
The consequences were many, one of which being a convenient assumption on the 
part of increasingly under-funded local boroughs that mass housing units had a short 
lifespan; demolition was always on the horizon. Investment in maintenance was 
relaxed if not abandoned. This critically effected some modernist exemplars. While it 
is factually correct to say that even modernist exemplars were built under tight 
financial conditions and thus with materials whose quality was often wanting. Their 
longevity testifies to the supremacy of design. Peter and Alison Smithsons' Robin 
Hood Gardens is one example.  
 
Under a protracted demolition order, fought off by supporters, Robin Hood Gardens 
finally succumbed to local authority demolition (in favour of corporate property 
development) in August 2017. Designed in 1968 and completed in 1972, it was a 
mass block housing estate that exemplified an extended vertical street, albeit in a 
shape and form that responds to the coordinates of the awkwardly situated piece of 
land. Originally a Greater London Council commission, the designated was allotted a 
land plot entirely compromised by badly planned roads, offering up to six thousand 
residents the prospect of being marooned on an urban wasteland unwanted for any 
other function. Robin Hood Gardens was conceived as in essence a space for green 
vegetation, nurtured and protected by two blocks figuratively forming praying hands. 
The urban wasteland became an oasis of quiet and nature, or at least could have 
been.  
 
The Smithson's began as London County Council architects in the early 1950s, 
members of CIAM and other progressive groups, then became less architect builders 
than architect theorists, whose plans and publications were far more influential than 
their (few) actual builds. (28) Robin Hood Gardens exemplifies the ideas-based 
intellectual rigor of their approach, their non-doctrinaire commitment to CIAM, as 
much as the fate of international modernism in London. The facades of each of the 
two blocks are not dissimilar to a Mondrian painting -- a seeming regularity and 
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predictability so ridiculed in modernist architecture reveals infinite variation and 
framed the expected open interactive social movement of its thousands of residents. 
The two housing blocks — ten storey (east) and seven storey (west) — facilitated 
total mobility through elevated walkways, and interconnections outside all 2013 
apartments cultivated social community. The blocks shielded the residents from 
major roads on either side without blocking natural light, but also contained structural 
variation with single and multi-storey maisonettes. Balconies and, by each entrance 
door, "pause spaces" or alcoves that articulate the design as well as providing 
spaces for group conversation and children's play. What was more significant, was 
that Robin Hood Gardens as a design was not just a building, but a manifestation of 
a growing historical discourse: it was an intellectually reflexive instantiation of a fully 
researched and growing historical discourse on equitable forms of social habitation.  
 
 
Section Four: The dissolution of public planning 
 
The collapse of London's first serious attempt at Mayoral governance in the Greater 
London Council (GLC) in 1986, was also the demise of the rule of public planning, 
however compromised that had become. Since 1947, urban planning had been 
predicated on industrial and social growth, where planning facilitated cohesion as 
much as coherence in the relation between society and the operations of economy. 
Few planners anticipated the challenges of the urban contraction affected by de-
industrialisation, which adversely effected London in the 1970s and early 1980s. The 
de-industrialisation of London in the 1970s has been subject to scholarly scrutiny. 
(29)   
 
London between 1985-2000 was the only city in the Western world without a 
municipal government. Powers were devolved to the boroughs, or (like sanitation or 
fire) awarded to new "boards" or public committees. Tony Blair's Labour government, 
elected in 1997, used the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to hold elections, to 
which a directly elected Mayor and a separately elected London Assembly emerged 
— both together forming the Greater London Authority. Reminiscent of the old GLC, 
but with its powers reduced enough to secure Westminster dominance, former leader 
MP Ken Livingstone defied the Labour Government's wishes, ran and won the 
election, being duly expelled from the party for doing so. One major implication of the 
rise of the GLC was urban planning. Between 1985 and 2000, London had become a 
very international city, without a grand strategic plan for a form of urban development 
that might facilitate this or redirect its potential adverse effects. The postwar 
"patchwork" (Banham's term) of housing, industry, retail, transportation, services and 
leisure, had become incoherent, and moreover, amassed a range of interested 
agencies. By the time the first Mayor of London had drafted a new "London Plan" in 
2004 (an integrated development plan for the whole of the city), each segment of the 
city's many centers were subject to the interests of investors, banks, boroughs and 
local authority housing or planning departments, government agencies (or QANGOs, 
as was the acronym), consultants and any number of NGO or social institutions, from 
churches to major educational charities. (30)  
 
The multitude of vested interests in urban development that had emerged before the 
new mayoral authority was a tense combination of increased rights for communities 
and civil society consultation during the planning process, and economic 
globalisation facilitated by market liberalisation. The first example of this was in East 
London docklands area, blighted in the 1970s by the decline of shipping. The 
government Inner Urban Areas act 1978 was a policy innovation that defined for the 
first time the ‘inner city’ as a unique urban phenomenon, albeit a well of social 
problems. (31) The sources of social problems were identified principally as 
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unemployment and lack of family income. It was, however, defined largely by social 
problems to which market liberalism and increased employment were, in advance, 
the main solution. To mediate the new solution (and its tacit "free market" ideology), 
equally innovative delivery mechanisms for urban change were established. These 
were so powerful, it required another act of Parliament -- the Planning and Land Act 
of 1980 – which in turn saw the creation of Urban Development Corporations (UCDs: 
under Section 136 of the Act).  
 
The UCDs, of which the London Docklands Development Corporation was the most 
renown, operated on a "public-private partnership" principle. This entailed a UCD to 
use powers in trading public land and assets with private contractors, and managing 
investment and returns in a way that was mutually profitable for private investors, 
local government and, ostensibly, the public. Before its powers were revoked by the 
incoming Labour government of 1997, the London Docklands Development 
Corporation had amassed powers of planning, land re-allocation and compulsory 
purchasing, only previously used by politically elected public authorities. It had also 
built Canary Wharf, and other innovations, to huge acclaim. The visual spectacle of 
the new Wharf alone is testament to its extraordinary paradox where financial 
success and unprecedented planning freedoms come at the cost of a highly 
specialised, socially stratified, island of capital, where the immediate environs (either 
natural or social) remain unaffected (except where their views of the city are 
blocked). (32)  
 
A seminal moment was Margaret Thatcher's Local Government, Planning and Land 
Act 1980, the basis of the now-famous “right to buy” of council housing. What is 
historically significant is the way the Act effectively collapsed central post-War 
principles, that housing was a political obligation, and its design was central to the 
urban planning of cities. Thatcher and her housing minister (minister for 
Environment, Michael Heseltine) promoted the notion that “right to buy” was a 
transfer of capital from the State to the people. The practical impact of a mass 
purchase (at reduced cost) of private individuals (council tenants) resulted, in one 
generation, in a mass transfer of property from public ownership to the broader 
market. The 1980 Act obviously anticipated this transfer, with its concomitant 
legislation allowing for private developers to engage in urban planning, attract foreign 
direct investment and use public land for private speculative and retail use. It also 
heralded a new discipline in urban planning, that of masterplanning.  
 
The new "masterplan" became a central mechanism of British urban planning 
throughout the 1990s and remains today: the masterplan is a combination of site 
plan and strategic plan (with detailed specification on design of specific buildings and 
places, but with strategic reference to urban policy of both local and national 
government). The masterplan undercut local town planners, as it could design, 
manage and resource the construction process; it was a project management 
framework that within a generation had reduced public planners to contract and 
permissions clerks. A range of increasingly international private contractors evolved 
significant professional competencies in planning and design, along with 
sophisticated staged funding through complex third and fourth party investment. The 
1980 Act also saw a disinvestment of public funds in local authority planning, 
disincentivising local authorities for undertaking any large projects themselves; risk 
(and thus innovation) was virtually prohibited. Right-to-Buy continues to this day and 
serves to continually reduce the provision of council housing, and with it the 
fundamental intellectual interest in housing as a design fulcrum for the planning and 
renewal of cities.   
 
There were two notable aspects to Thatcher's attack on the public priority in housing. 
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The first was the echoes of England's profound and deep "anti-city" intellectual 
movements, such as the garden city or garden suburb, and later "new town" 
movements, representing a rejection of inner city habitation and the social intensities 
it represented. The enduring influence of Raymond Unwin, Barry Parker, Frederick 
Osborn and Patrick Geddes, William Morris and the Arts and Crafts Movement, is 
part of England's intellectual heritage. Whatever effect this did have, a more 
significant factor was the lack of political defense of public planning on the part of the 
noble and pioneering professional associations -- Royal Institute of British Architects 
(1834); Royal Town Planning Institute (1914); Town and Country Planning 
Association (1899); Architectural Association (1847), and others. The professions 
recognised internal problems with the architect-dominated public monopoly on 
planning, and indeed many of their members were now working for private 
contractors and skeptical of the post-War settlement's legacy.  
 
By way of illustration, the one minor episode in the ill-fated Greater London Council 
epitomises the political complexity of the situation. The GLC was, as noted, situated 
on the south bank of the river Thames. South and north were, even until the 1980s, 
distinct urban spaces insofar as almost all of the city's institutions and businesses are 
north of the river. The eighteenth and nineteenth century saw the south bank develop 
as a series of wharfs and small docks, warehouses, power stations and services for 
the rest of the city. The geo-politics of planning in the 1970s and 1980s was, in part at 
least, animated by the attempt to enfranchise the south and integrate its urban 
development into the finance, commerce and industrialisation of the north. This actual 
began with the founding of County Hall itself in 1919, then again with Festival of 
Britain after the War. With a decreasing population, the south bank opposite 
Westminster and the City became vulnerable for cooption and exploitation. (33) 
 
A community group emerged in the early 1970s in initial protests against 
encroachments on their local area, and then a proposed commercial property 
expansion of offices, threatening to colonise the south and push up prices. This 
protest morphed into an organised attempt at community-based urban planning, and 
survives today as the Coin Street Community Builders. While their planning victories 
are small in the context of London's urban history, the Coin Street area was, for a brief 
period, an epicenter of a political crisis. The 1971 Town and Country Planning Act 
allowed for legitimate community consultation, and the 1970s saw developers looking 
to extend the north bank office dominated landscape into the south. The community 
group composed their own competitor plan, so as to be represented as a credible 
party, and this resulting in "one of the longest, costliest, most important and most 
confused" public planning inquiries, reaching the highest levels of the then 
Conservative government (Baeten, 2009: 240). The Minister for Environment, Michael 
Heseltine personally assumed a role as adjudicator, rejecting both plans, despite the 
commercial plan receiving the full support of the then Conservative dominated GLC. 
While it seems that Heseltine hoped for a political compromised between both parties, 
they in fact polarised; the commercial developer (who in the meantime had expanded 
its company and its capital) had hired the services of architect Richard Rogers who 
had designed an already acclaimed, office-based concept on the riverside. A second 
inquiry was inevitable. 
 
Central to the battle was land ownership: the commercial developer owned half the 
proposed site, the GLC the other. In 1981, the Labour Party assumed dominance of 
the GLC, and as a second inquiry ensued, they supported the community group with 
professional services and funding. While Heseltine approved the plans of both 
commercial and community parties (no doubt expecting the latter to fail through lack 
of resources and finance), he did not countenance how the Coin Street community 
party could, through protest and legal delays in their opponents planning permits, 
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make the commercial investment in time unviable. The ensuing 1980s was a 
deepening recession, the intensity of commercial demand declined, and by 1984 the 
commercial developer agreed to sell their share of the land to the GLC. In a stunning 
political maneuver, the GLC imposed planning restrictions on the site (in harmony with 
the community plan) devalued the land commercially, then sold a significant part 
thereof to the community group at a price far lower than the value, themselves 
providing loans to make the sale possible.  
 
The GLC's actions were one of a panoply of Left vanguard approaches incompatible 
with the new Conservative private enterprise ideology. Margaret Thatcher personally 
oversaw the closure of the central London government, and with it, obligations to fund 
community involvement. From 1985 the Coin Street Community Builders had to 
proceed on the terms of private developers, and to this day operate as a development 
non-profit, albeit with large commercial interests (and, since the early 1990s, have 
forged partnerships with north of the river banking, commerce and finance agencies). 
The Coin street development now sits on prime real estate between the South Bank 
Centre and Tate Modern and Shakespeare's globe downriver, symbolic of social 
division. (34) 
 
Conclusion  
The vast and complex political terrain of London's urban governance since 1945 has 
been distilled in this paper in order to highlight the centrality of urban planning, along 
with its rhetorical significance in the politics of post-War reconstruction, its 
imaginative role in a new national enterprise of "society-building", and the production 
of leadership in the form of the modernist architect. Yet, while an architect-led new 
public realm seemed politically possible, the political conditions for public planning 
shifted in adverse ways. The purpose of this paper was to extrapolate from the 
available historical narratives a line of inquiry that would generate further inquiry. 
This further inquiry is how the year 1980 marks the collapse of the public monopoly 
on planning and the rise of "urban regeneration" agencies, many of which have 
transmuted into sophisticated international property development corporations and 
partners with public authorities in London's new "global city" landscape. How one of 
the world's leading global cities has emerged without a signicant strategy of 
globalisation, and how did urban regeneration since 1980 provide the conditions for 
new entrepreneurial partnership-based approaches to planning that so facilitated this 
globalisation? How did this translate into shifts in architectural vernacular and stylistic 
preferences after the dismissal of international modernism? How did urban, social 
and cultural policies intersect in ways that facilitated the globalisation of London’s 
capital city?  
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